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 Abstract 
 
The Continuity Hypothesis of dreaming states that waking life is continuous with 
dreams, but many of the factors that have been postulated to influence wake-
dream continuity have rarely been studied. The present study investigated whether 
certain factors – emotional and stressfulness intensity, and certain types of 
experiences – influence the likelihood of a waking-life experience being 
incorporated into a dream. Participants (N=32) kept dream diaries and waking-life 
experience logs for fourteen consecutive days, and waking-life experiences were 
matched to dream reports. Waking-life experiences that were incorporated into 
dreams were significantly more emotional, but no more stressful, than those that 
were not incorporated into dreams. Major daily activities were incorporated 
significantly less than the combination of personally significant experiences, major 
concerns, and novel experiences. Results are discussed in terms of dream 
functionality, particularly in relation to a postulated emotional memory assimilation 
theory of dream function.  
Keywords: dreaming, emotional memory, Continuity Hypothesis, dream function 
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 Introduction 
 
The ‘Continuity Hypothesis’ of dreaming states that waking-life experiences (which 
may include activities, thoughts, and emotions) are continued, or carried over, into 
dreams, and that dreams are continued into waking life (e.g. Hall & Nordby, 1972; 
Schredl, 2012; Schredl & Hoffman, 2003). It has been suggested that there are 
factors that may influence whether or not a waking-life experience is incorporated 
into a dream, such as the emotional intensity of the experience, and the type of the 
waking-life experience (Schredl, 2002). The concept that there are certain factors 
that can influence wake-dream continuity has bearing on potential functions of 
dreaming of waking life. For example, if emotion is a factor that affects wake-dream 
continuity, it might be that dreaming has some role in processing or integrating 
waking-life emotions, as is thought by many current sleep and dream researchers 
(e.g. Desseilles et al., 2010; Payne, 2010; Walker, 2009; Wamsley & Stickgold, 2011). 
This paper presents the results of a study designed to investigate the question of 
whether certain factors – emotional intensity and also stressfulness intensity, as 
well as certain types of experiences (everyday, personally significant, concerning, 
and novel) – influence the likelihood of a waking-life experience being incorporated 
into a dream. 
Many studies indicate that the emotionality of a waking-life experience influences 
its incorporation into a dream. In early laboratory-based studies of dream research, 
it was found that directly influencing dream content by exposing participants to pre-
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sleep stimuli such as arousing films was difficult to achieve, but that affecting the 
emotional tenor of dreams was relatively easy (e.g. Cartwright et al., 1969; Foulkes 
& Rechtschaffen, 1964; Goodenough et al., 1975; Kuiken et al., 1991; Lauer et al., 
1987; Witkin, 1969), indicating that dream emotions are easier to influence than 
dream content directly. Additionally, the fact that there is a well-documented effect 
of the experimental situation on dream content, and that this was particularly true 
in the early years of sleep research when the equipment used was less well-known 
and thus perhaps more anxiety-provoking for participants, may also illustrate the 
influence of emotionality on wake-dream continuity (Schredl, 2008). Further, the 
under-representation of cognitively-focused activities (such as reading) and 
everyday concerns (such as finances), and the over-representation of activities such 
as talking with friends and other social interactions (Hartmann, 2000; McNamara et 
al., 2005; Roussy, 2000; Roussy et al., 1996; Schredl, 2000; Schredl & Erlacher, 2008; 
Schredl & Hoffman, 2003; Schredl et al., 2009), may also indicate that emotionally-
laden waking-life activities continue into dreams more than others (Schredl & 
Hoffman, 2003).  
A study by Schredl (2006) provides strong evidence for this notion. Participants 
rated the emotional intensity and emotional valence of their waking-life 
experiences, and recorded their dreams, for two weeks. It was found that waking-
life experiences that were incorporated into dreams were significantly more 
emotionally intense than those that were not incorporated, but that emotional 
valence did not differ. Thus, for both positive and negative waking-life experiences, 
emotional intensity influenced wake-dream continuity. While this is good evidence 
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for the emotionality of an experience being a factor that affects continuity, the 
paper acknowledges that effect size was small, perhaps due to the small sample 
(only 64 dreams), so this result requires replication. 
Intensely emotional waking-life experiences, particularly those that are negative, 
may also be expected to be ‘stressful’, where stress is a negative and aversive state 
(Kasl, 1995), with both physiological components such as raised heart rate and 
psychological components such as anxiety (Levi, 1995). Several researchers have 
suggested that stressful waking-life experiences are also preferentially incorporated 
into dreams, indicating that stressfulness, as well as emotionality, may be a factor 
that influences continuity (e.g. Breger, 1967; Koulack, 1993; Piccioni et al., 2002; 
Wright & Koulack, 1987). For example, dreams are very clearly affected by traumatic 
experiences (see reviews by, for example, Barrett (1996) and Punamäki (2007)), and 
other more common stressful waking-life experiences such as surgery (Breger, 
Hunter, & Lane, 1971) and divorce (Cartwright, 1991, 2011; Cartwright et al., 1984; 
Cartwright et al., 2001; Cartwright et al., 2006). However, while some experimental 
studies have found measurable effects of stressful experiences on dreams, mostly 
in terms of dream affect (de Koninck & Brunette, 1991; de Koninck & Koulack, 1975; 
Koulack et al., 1985), a naturalistic study found no effect either in terms of direct or 
indirect incorporations, or changes to dream affect (Delorme et al., 2002). The 
authors of the latter study suggested that the stress created by examinations (the 
stressor) may not have been great enough to elicit direct incorporations. They did 
find, however, that students who did not dream of their examinations used 
problem-solving in waking life most frequently, and that students who used positive 
5 
 
reappraisal in waking life used problem-solving in dreams. This, it was suggested, 
may mean that the problem-solving strategy ‘worked’ in waking life, negating the 
need for incorporation in dreams, whereas the positive reappraisal strategy simply 
made the problem seem less distressing but did not actually solve it, necessitating 
the need for problem-solving incorporations in dreams.  
Negative emotion and stress can be experienced independently. Negative emotion 
can be conceived of as a negative mood, feeling or state encompassing of which the 
dreamer is aware, and can be identifiable individually (such as sadness, anger, 
apprehension, confusion), whilst stress can be conceived of as a negative and 
aversive state of arousal with both psychological components such as feelings of 
anxiety and physical components such as raised heart rate. 
In addition to the potential for the emotionality and stressfulness of a waking-life 
experience being factors of influence in wake-dream continuity, there is also 
evidence to suggest that other aspects of the type of the waking-life experience may 
influence its incorporation into a dream. For example, de Koninck and Brunette 
(1991) suggested that the lack of direct effect on dreams of the stressor in their 
study may be explained by the stressor being less relevant in participants’ lives than 
their other real-life concerns. Indeed, studies have demonstrated that both with 
and without pre-sleep suggestion, participants dream of their waking-life concerns 
(Hoelscher et al., 1981, Nikles et al., 1998; Saredi et al., 1997), and a vast body of 
research utilising the content analysis of dream series has illustrated that dreams 
reflect waking-life concerns (e.g. Domhoff, 1996, 2003, 2011; Hall, 1953; Hall & 
Nordby, 1972). Many researchers have, on the basis of such results, suggested that 
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waking-life concerns may be preferentially incorporated into dreams (e.g. Davidson, 
Lee-Archer & Sanders, 2005; Domhoff, Meyer-Gomes & Schredl, 2006; Hartmann, 
1996). On the other hand, other studies have found that independent judges were 
not able to match either pre-sleep thoughts or significant concerns to dream 
material (Roussy, 2000; Roussy et al., 1996), and some aspects of dreams in content 
analysis studies do not relate to participants’ concerns, such as guns and kittens for 
one participant (Domhoff, 2003). Thus, there is some evidence for concern being an 
influence on continuity, but it is not conclusive.   
Two other factors of potential influence on wake-dream continuity, both of which 
were investigated in the present study, are the novelty of the waking-life experience 
and the personal significance of the waking-life experience. Fosse et al. (2003) 
investigated the presence of episodic memories in dreams, and found that very few 
dreams (<2%) contained intact episodic memories, but that 65% of the dreams 
contained episodic memory entries, suggesting that episodic memory elements may 
be fragmentarily incorporated during sleep. Schwartz (2003) postulated that the 
fragments may be preferentially incorporated due to their novelty or salience. For 
example, the experimental situation, which, as noted, is often incorporated into 
participants’ dreams and was speculated by Schredl (2008) to be due to the 
emotionality of the situation, may rather be due to the novelty of the situation 
(Schwartz & Maquet, 2002). Similarly, Desseilles et al. (2010) postulated that the 
novel and/or “individually-relevant” (p.1000) features of waking-life experiences 
may be selectively incorporated for consolidation and integration into the memory 
system. Likewise, other researchers have hypothesised that dreams may reflect the 
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consolidation of novel information: for example, Payne and Nadel (2004) suggested 
that dreams reflect the memory integration processes of weaving in new 
information into old material, and Stickgold et al. (2001) suggested that dreams 
reflect the process of novel cortical associations being identified and evaluated in 
the brain. These ideas all indicate that novel and/or personally significant 
experiences may be preferentially incorporated into dreams in order to be 
assimilated into and/or evaluated by the wider memory system.  
The evidence presented above indicates that the emotional intensity and the 
stressfulness intensity of a waking-life experience may affect its incorporation into 
a dream, and that concerns, novel experiences, and/or personally significant 
experiences may be preferentially incorporated into dreams over other kinds of 
experiences. Concomitantly, it may be expected that experiences that do not stand 
out (and may be deemed ‘everyday’) are less likely to be incorporated into dreams 
than those that do. These hypotheses were all tested in the present study.    
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Participants were recruited from the participation credit scheme at Leeds 
Metropolitan University, in which undergraduate psychology students participate 
for course credits; and via opportunity sample. 32 participants (26 female, 6 male; 
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16 Leeds Metropolitan University undergraduates, 16 acquaintances of the 
researchers) were recruited, with an age range of 19 to 55 years of age (M = 26.44, 
SD = 9.40). 328 dreams were collected in total with a mean of 9.91 dreams per 
participant (SD = 4.87).  
 
Design 
 
The dream-diary paradigm was employed over fourteen consecutive days. 
Participants were requested to record as many of their dreams as possible, in as 
much detail as possible but without post-hoc elaboration, upon awakening from 
sleep at any part of the night or in the morning. In addition, waking-life experiences 
were collected in a Daily Activity Log. For this, participants were requested to record 
up to five each of the following waking-life experiences: major daily activities 
(MDAs), i.e. everyday experiences that take up much of the day (such as working, 
eating, and travelling), personally significant experiences (PSEs), major concerns 
(MCs), and novel experiences (NEs), for each day of the study. Participants were 
given instructions on what each of the types of activities constituted. This design 
followed that of Fosse et al. (2003), with the exception of NEs, which was added for 
the purposes of the present study. For each waking-life experience and dream, 
participants were requested to rate the emotional intensity and stressfulness 
intensity on a scale of 0 (not at all intense) to 9 (very intense). Participants were also 
requested to provide a report of how each dream related to their waking life, and 
rate the individual waking-life elements that appeared in the dream, such as 
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characters or objects, for wake-dream similarity on a scale of 1 (no similarity) to 5 
(identical). 
Waking-life experiences were then categorised as ‘incorporated into a dream’ or 
‘not incorporated into a dream’. A waking experience was deemed to be 
incorporated if there was an unambiguous match between the waking-life 
associations the participant made to the dream and the waking-life experience 
reported in the log. For example, a participant reported a phone call with her 
mother as a personally significant experience (PSE), and in the waking-life report 
following a dream from that night, she wrote: “I think the phone conversation with 
my mum had much to do with the worry, turned it into a report of death in the brief 
dream”. Thus, this was scored as an incorporation.  
 
Materials 
 
Participants were given a booklet in which to record their dreams and waking-life 
experiences for fourteen consecutive days. The front page contained the 
instructions on how to record dreams, waking-life experiences, and wake-dream 
relations. The remainder of the booklet comprised one Daily Activity Log and three 
Dream Logs for each day of the study (14 days in total, a total of 14 Daily Activity 
and 42 Dream Logs). Each Dream Log contained one A4 page for participants to 
describe the dream and rate it for emotionality and stressfulness on a scale of 0 (not 
at all intense) to 9 (very intense). On the back of this page was space for participants 
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to identify up to 20 elements (characters, objects, actions, locations, emotions and 
themes) of the dream that seemed to them to relate to a waking-life experience, 
and record the degree of similarity between the dream and the waking experience 
on a scale of 1 (no similarity) to 5 (identical). Finally, space was provided for 
participants to describe the waking-life experience(s) to which they believed the 
dream was related.  
  
Procedure 
 
Participants met with the researcher and were given the booklet. They were 
requested to follow the instructions within the booklet and return it after they had 
completed the fourteen consecutive days of the study. Each day participants 
completed the daily activity log in the evening before they went to bed, reported 
their dreams upon awakening in the morning, and then considered the relationship 
between the dream elements and their waking life.  
The study abided by British Psychological Society ethical guidelines, and received 
local approval from an institutional panel at Leeds Metropolitan University.  
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Analyses 
Analyses aimed to test the predictions of the two areas of study: the effect of the 
emotional intensity and the stressfulness intensity of the waking-life experience; 
and the effect of the type of waking-life experience (in terms of concern, personal 
significance, novelty, and ‘everydayness’). 
For the emotionality and stressfulness analysis, average emotionality and 
stressfulness ratings for incorporated and non-incorporated waking-life 
experiences were calculated for each participant, and the means for the 
incorporated experiences were compared against the means for the non-
incorporated experiences. It was hypothesised that waking-life experiences that 
were incorporated into dreams would have significantly higher emotionality and 
stressfulness ratings than waking-life experiences that were not incorporated into 
dreams.  
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For the type of waking-life experience analyses, a proportion of incorporation for 
each of the four types of experience was first calculated for each participant by 
summing the number of times a type of experience was incorporated into a dream, 
and dividing by the total number of that type of experience. For example, if a 
participant incorporated 10 of the 50 major daily activities (MDAs) they reported 
into a dream, their MDA incorporation rate would be 10/50 = 0.2 (20%). If a certain 
activity was repeated more than once across the fourteen days, specific 
incorporations were included only once, while all incidences of the activity were 
included in the activities denominator. For example, if on one night a participant 
dreamt of something to do with making the previous night’s dinner, and a total of 
five activities were recorded to do with making dinner, this would be counted as 
one incorporation, and five activities in the denominator. This calculation was 
performed on the other three types of experience also. It was hypothesised that 
PSEs, MCs, and NEs would each be incorporated into dreams more than MDAs, and 
that MDAs would be incorporated less than the three other experiences both 
individually and all together.  
 
 
Results 
 
Emotionality and stressfulness analyses 
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Three participants’ data were excluded from these analyses because they did not 
report emotionality and/or stressfulness for their waking-life experiences; 
therefore the N was reduced to 29. Average emotionality and stressfulness scores 
were calculated for each participant for incorporated experiences and non-
incorporated experiences. These means across participants (rather than across 
individual dreams) are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Average Participant Ratings for Emotionality and Stressfulness of Waking-
Life Experiences 
 
Experience Mean (SD) 
Emotionality of all waking-life experiences 4.50 (1.92) 
Emotionality of incorporated waking-life experiences  4.97 (2.00) 
Emotionality of non-incorporated waking-life experiences 4.03 (1.17) 
Stressfulness of all waking-life experiences 3.08 (1.63) 
Stressfulness of incorporated waking-life experiences 3.25 (2.00) 
Stressfulness of non-incorporated waking-life experiences 2.91 (1.17) 
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 As can be seen from Table 1, emotionality for incorporated experiences was rated 
the highest on average. Stressfulness of non-incorporated experiences was rated as 
being much lower on average. All four sets of data (emotionality and stressfulness 
of incorporated and non-incorporated activities) were normally distributed, so 
repeated-measures t-tests were used: Emotionality for incorporated and non-
incorporated experiences was compared. Similarly, stressfulness ratings for 
incorporated and non-incorporated experiences were compared. Since two tests 
were being performed, the alpha level was Bonferroni-corrected to .025. As 
predicted, waking-life experiences that were incorporated into dreams were 
significantly more emotionally intense (M = 4.97, SD = 2.00) than waking 
experiences that were not incorporated into dreams (M = 4.03, SD = 1.17), t(28) = 
3.45, p < .01, r = .55. This is a large effect, according to Cohen (1988, 1992, in Field, 
2009). However, contrary to the hypothesis, there was no significant difference 
between stressfulness ratings of waking experiences that were incorporated into 
dreams (M = 3.25, SD = 2.00) and those that were not incorporated (M = 2.91, SD = 
1.17), t(28) = 1.02, p > .025. 
 
 
Type of waking-life experience analyses 
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A proportion of incorporation for each waking-life experience was calculated, as 
described in the method section. The distribution of each type of activity is shown 
in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of each type of experience 
 Mean no. reported 
(SD) (maximum 70) 
Mean proportion 
of incorporation 
(SD) 
Mean emotional 
intensity (SD) 
Major Daily Activities 39.5 (16.56) 0.05 (0.04) 5.93 (2.16) 
Personally Significant 
Experiences 
3.36 (2.38) 0.12 (0.19) 5.45 (2.49) 
Major Concerns 13.89 (9.42) 0.11 (0.13) 5.55 (2.31) 
Novel Experiences 5.43 (5.51) 0.11 (0.19) 4.23 (2.33) 
 
 
As Table 2 shows, MDAs were over-represented among participants, with a mean 
of almost 40 MDAs reported per participant. MCs were much less common, with a 
mean of almost 14 MCs reported per participant. NEs and PSEs were comparatively 
very under-represented, with means of 5 and 3 per participant respectively. NEs 
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and PSEs also had minimums of 0, indicating that some participants did not record 
any NEs or PSEs over the course of the two weeks. However, although more MDAs 
were reported than the other types of experience, they were less incorporated: a 
5% incorporation rate, compared to NEs, PSEs, and MCs which were incorporated 
to similar degrees, with incorporation rates of between 11% and 12%. The 
emotional intensity of the four experiences differed little, with only NEs displaying 
a clear difference in emotionality, in that they were less emotionally intense, on 
average, than the other three experiences, which were all similar in their emotional 
intensity.  
Because the data for PSEs, MCs, and NEs were non-normal, a Friedman’s ANOVA by 
rank was performed on the data to examine whether there was a difference in the 
frequency with which the four types of waking-life experiences were incorporated 
into dreams. It was found that there was no significant difference in the proportion 
of incorporations of MDAs, PSEs, MCs, and NEs, χ2 (3) = 3.70, p > .05. 
It was also tested whether there was a difference in frequency of incorporation 
between MDAs and the other three types of experience combined. For this analysis, 
the data (MDAs and (PSEs + MCs + NEs)/3) were normally distributed, so a repeated-
measures t-test was used to compare the proportion of MDAs that were 
incorporated into a dream with the proportion non-MDAs (PSEs + MCs + NEs)/3) 
that were incorporated into a dream. MDAs (M = 0.05, SD = 0.04) were incorporated 
into dreams significantly less frequently than non-MDAs (M = 0.11, SD = 0.09), t(22) 
= -3.10, p < .01, r = .51. This is a large effect size according to Cohen (1988, 1992, in 
Field, 2009).  
17 
 
In addition, for a complete understanding of the data, each type of experience was 
compared against the combination of the other three also. There were no 
significant differences in the proportion of incorporation of PSEs and the others 
((MDAs + MCs + NEs)/3), MCs and the others ((MDAs + PSEs + NEs)/3) and NEs and 
the others ((MDAs + PSEs + MCs)/3) (all ps > .05).  
 
 
Discussion 
 
The study found that waking-life experiences that were incorporated into dreams 
were significantly more emotional, but not more stressful, than waking-life 
experiences that were not incorporated into dreams, and that there was no 
significant difference in the proportion with which major daily activities, personally 
significant experiences, major concerns, and novel experiences each were 
incorporated into dreams, but when the latter three were combined, major daily 
activities were incorporated significantly less than the others. From these results, 
three main questions require consideration. Firstly, why were emotional waking-life 
experiences preferentially incorporated into dreams? Secondly, why were stressful 
waking-life experiences not preferentially incorporated into dreams? And thirdly, 
why were major daily activities incorporated less frequently than other types of 
experiences combined, but none of the others were incorporated more frequently 
than major daily activities? 
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On the matter of why intensely emotional experiences were preferentially 
incorporated into dreams (a replication with a larger sample of Schredl’s (2006) 
results), it can be suggested that one of the many emotion-processing theories of 
dreaming may be able to account for the findings. For example, evidence suggests 
that dreams facilitate ‘mastery’ over affectively arousing memories (Breger, 1967; 
Koulack, 1993; Wright & Koulack, 1987); emotional experiences are dreamt of 
repetitively until they are resolved (Hartmann, 1998); and dreams may enable the 
amelioration of emotions attached to waking-life experiences (Hartmann, 1996; 
Walker & van der Helm, 2009), perhaps particularly for fear emotions (Levin & 
Nielsen, 2007, 2009; Levin et al., 2010; Nielsen & Lara-Carrasco, 2007). Another 
interpretation of the results could come from the emotional memory consolidation 
theory of sleep and dreaming, which is related to, but slightly different from, the 
emotion-processing theory. Consolidation may refer more specifically to the 
strengthening of the emotional memory, rather than processing or ameliorating it, 
during sleep (Franzen et al., 2009; Hu et al., 2006; Wagner et al., 2001), and dreams 
may be a reflection of this sleep-dependent memory consolidation process 
(Wamsley & Stickgold, 2011).  
An alternative possible interpretation of the findings is that it is simply easier to 
recall intensely emotional dreams than less emotional ones (Meier et al., 1968), so 
the finding could be interpreted as a memory bias for more intensely emotional 
dreams, which may relate to more intensely emotional waking-life experiences. 
Another possibility is that the results were affected by the method (dreams 
collected via spontaneous awakenings) and may not have been found with a 
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systematic-awakenings method, since morning dreams are more emotional than 
those earlier in the night (Baylor & Cavallero, 2001; Hobson et al., 2000; Wamsley 
et al., 2007). Thus, the study should be replicated in future utilising a systematic-
awakenings method.  
The evidence presented in the introduction for the incorporation of stressful 
waking-life experiences into dreams led to the hypothesis that incorporated 
waking-life experiences would be more intensely stressful than non-incorporated 
experiences, as was found for emotionality. However, this was not found. An 
examination of the correlation between waking-life experience emotionality and 
waking-life experience stressfulness in the study illustrated that the relationship 
was fairly strong (.41), but weak enough for the concepts to be demonstrably 
different. While emotions can be positive, negative, or neutral, and the intensity of 
emotion is not related to the valence (nor does valence mediate incorporations: 
Schredl, 2006), the psychological concept of stress is a negative, aversive state (Kasl, 
1995). As such, a waking-life experience can be intensely emotional without being 
intensely stressful, perhaps especially if the emotion is a positive one. Thus, it may 
be that all (or at least most) highly stressful experiences are highly emotional, but 
not all highly emotional experiences are highly stressful, and so the two variables 
can (and do) act differently in relation to wake-dream continuity. However, 
participants’ own meaning of ‘stress’ was not elicited and it may be that stress was 
not always negative to all participants. We are exploring effects of valence as well 
as emotional intensity and stressful in another study. 
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Nevertheless, it was surprising that stressfulness was not also found to be a factor, 
since some research has illustrated that experiencing stressful situations leads to 
dreaming of those situations, such as surgery (Breger, Hunter, & Lane, 1971) and 
divorce (Cartwright, 1991, 2011; Cartwright et al., 1984; Cartwright et al., 2001; 
Cartwright et al., 2006), and many researchers have concluded that dreams reflect 
waking-life stressors (e.g. Breger, 1967; Koulack, 1993; Piccioni et al., 2002; Schredl, 
2002; Wright & Koulack, 1987).  
Regarding studies that have found little or no direct effect of waking-life stressors 
on dreams, even if there is some effect on dream tone (e.g. de Koninck & Brunette, 
1991; de Koninck & Koulack, 1975; Koulack et al., 1985; Delorme et al., 2002), some 
researchers have suggested that the stressors being measured were simply not 
important enough in participants’ lives to elicit a measurable effect (see also 
Hartmann, 1996). This is in line with Wright and Koulack’s (1987) theory that benign 
stressors can be mastered before sleep and therefore do not need to be dreamt of, 
and it is only potent stressors that are incorporated. Perhaps in the present study 
the ‘real’ or most potent stressors in participants’ lives were not effectively elicited 
by the instructions of the study; or perhaps participants simply did not experience 
stressful enough life events like surgery or divorce for stressfulness to be detectable 
as an effect. The difference between the average waking-life experience 
emotionality rating (4.50) and the average waking-life experience stressfulness 
rating (3.08) was significant, potentially supporting this interpretation.  
The preferential incorporation of intensely emotional waking-life experiences may 
be best explained by an emotional memory assimilation theory (Malinowski & 
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Horton, in prep.): emotions may provide unconscious information about which 
experiences from waking life are important to be stored in the memory system, and 
so we may preferentially incorporate emotional memories in order to assimilate 
important information. Support for this idea comes from emotional memory 
research, which has shown that emotional stimuli are better recalled than neutral 
ones (Anderson et al., 2006; Atienza & Cantero, 2008), and that emotions facilitate 
recall even more than the purposeful effort to recall (Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). 
Moreover, in relation to the point that it is the intensity and not the valence of 
emotions that is crucial, Walker and van der Helm (2009) noted that memory 
encoding is facilitated by emotional arousal in a similar way in the brain in relation 
both to negative and positive stimuli. Additionally, it has been shown that sleep 
‘unbinds’ the emotional elements of memories for selective consolidation (Payne et 
al., 2008), again demonstrating how emotions seem to guide the process of 
determining which memories are chosen for encoding during sleep. The widespread 
evidence for the role of emotion in memory has led to one dream researcher 
suggesting that emotion ‘tells’ us what is important to recall and that this is why 
dreams selectively incorporate emotional experiences (Hartmann, 2010). It is not 
suggested that dreams selectively incorporate emotional experiences simply for the 
strengthening and enhanced recall of those experiences; rather, with many modern 
memory consolidation theories, it is suggested that emotional memories are 
incorporated into dreams in order to be integrated or assimilated into the wider 
memory system (Payne, 2010; Wamsley & Stickgold, 2011).  
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Regarding the ‘types of experience’ part of the study, it was found that there was 
no difference in the proportion with which major daily activities, personally 
significant experiences, major concerns, and novel experiences were incorporated 
into dreams individually, but that when the latter three were combined, major daily 
activities were incorporated significantly less than the others. These results do not 
support the hypotheses, in that it was anticipated, for example, that major concerns 
would be incorporated more than the combination of the other three. While the 
hypothesis for novelty and personal significance was speculative and based mostly 
on theory, the hypothesis for concern was based on a wealth of literature that has 
shown that concerns are frequently dreamt of (e.g. Domhoff. 1996, 2003, 2011; 
Hall, 1953; Hall & Nordby, 1972; Hoelscher et al., 1981, Nikles et al., 1998; Saredi et 
al., 1997), and so this null finding in particular was unexpected. It may be due to the 
paucity of participant recordings of personally significant experiences, novel 
experiences, and major concerns (an average of about 3, 5, and 14, respectively, out 
of a maximum of 70). The number of major daily activities, conversely, was much 
larger (almost 40 per participant). Personal significance, novelty, and concern thus 
need to be tested as factors again, with a larger sample of experiences. The finding 
that major daily activities were incorporated less than the combination of the other 
three, however, provides a tentative indication that waking-life experiences may be 
preferentially incorporated due to their not being the experiences that take up most 
of the day, such as travelling, working, eating, and so on, but those experiences that 
may be of short duration but stand out for some reason (such as personal 
significance, concern, or novelty): in other words, are ‘important’. As has been 
shown in the past, time spent on activities does not necessarily relate to dreaming 
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of them, as in the studies on cognitively-focused activities (Hartmann, 2000; 
Schredl, 2000; Schredl & Erlacher, 2008; Schredl & Hoffman, 2003; Schredl et al., 
2009). In a similar vein, in the present study on average 40 major daily activities 
were reported, almost double the combination of personally significant 
experiences, major concerns, and novel experiences, yet they were incorporated 
significantly less than the combination of the other three. Thus, perhaps time spent 
on activities is less influential for continuity than the importance of those activities, 
although how ‘importance’ is defined is not clear from the results of the study. The 
notion of dreaming of what is important to us accords with the above hypothesis of 
emotional memory assimilation: it was suggested there that emotions may ‘tell’ us 
what is important to be assimilated. This postulation is also in line with the 
suggestion of Schwartz (2003) and Desseilles et al. (2010), as mentioned in the 
introduction, that it is salient or relevant waking-life information that may be 
preferentially incorporated for memory assimilation during sleep.  
To conclude: it is suggested that emotional waking-life experiences may be 
incorporated into dreams preferentially over other less emotional experiences, 
because emotions provide an automatic and unconscious way of deciding which 
waking-life experiences to incorporate into sleep for assimilation into the memory 
system. Similarly, it may be that ‘important’ waking-life experiences may be 
preferentially incorporated, but the definition and understanding of ‘importance’ 
requires further research.  
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